zaterdag 29 december 2007

Palestijnse vluchtelingen zonder identiteitskaart rechtenloos in Libanon

Erger dan de 'gewone' Palestijnse vluchtelingen in Libanon zijn de Palestijnse vluchtelingen zonder identiteitspapieren eraan toe. Zij zijn niet alleen statenloos, maar bestaan letterlijk niet voor de Libanese autoriteiten, waardoor zij volledig rechtenloos zijn. Ze kunnen zelfs geen aanspraak maken op hulp van de UNRWA, de VN hulporganisatie die speciaal is opgezet voor Palestijnse vluchtelingen.

Ratna
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MIDEAST: They Do Not Exist, And That Is Official
By Mona Alami - Inter Press Service, 24-12-2007
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40588

BEIRUT, Dec 24 (IPS) - In the maze of dirty streets that spreads from Beirut's revamped Sport City to the shabby Halabi quarters, 20,000 refugees are clustered in what is known as the Bourj al-Barajneh Palestinian camp. In a town plagued by poverty, many families live in complete destitution.

These forgotten people have fallen through the cracks of legality and belong nowhere: they are known as non-ID Palestinians.

With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, many Palestinians fled their homeland to Lebanon. Today, there are approximately 400,000 refugees living in the 'Land of the Cedars', some with no documentation, and not registered with either the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) or the Lebanese authorities.

"I fell in love with a Palestinian combatant who came to Lebanon in the 1970s to fight with the PLO during the Lebanese civil war," says a woman who gave her name as Manal, not her real name. That marriage eventually brought her to this camp. "I was foolish and very much in love. My father was opposed to our marriage. The fighter had been smuggled into the country, and hence had no proper documentation. It was the first time I heard of non-IDs."

UNRWA considers as Palestinian refugees "any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost their home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. UNRWA's services are available to all those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency and who need assistance. UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948."

The agency's categorisation of Palestinian refugees does not include those classified as non-ID holders, leaving them unable to benefit from refugee services, including healthcare.

Non-ID Palestinian refugees also face restrictions on movement outside the camps -- and that is not all. "Aside from the daily difficulties they are confronted with as refugees, second and third generation undocumented Palestinians are beleaguered by other problems such as failing to graduate from school because of lack of proper documentation or the inability to get married and even to partake in ordinary activities," says Mireille Chiha from the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

Nawal lives in one of the many tiny concrete houses in Bourj al-Barajneh. Her handicapped father sits in bed all day. The apartment is damp and gloomy and its scarce windows look out on an alley flooded by a sewage pipe.

"I was married to a Jordanian Palestinian refugee who took part in the 1975 Lebanese civil war. We had two daughters, who both inherited his illegal status. My husband was supposed to regularise his situation, but one day he disappeared and I never saw him again. Today, my daughters are aged 20 and 18; I've been to the Jordanian embassy several times to try to obtain official documentation for them, but it seems their father is the only person allowed to make such a claim."

Nawal worries about her children's future. "How can they marry? They are not recognised by any government agency. It is true that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) may provide non-IDs with official documentation, which is useful in specific cases such as marriage, but I would much prefer my daughters not to take such a risk, as the organisation is sometimes viewed negatively by many Lebanese."

Sobhi Hassan, a young man in his twenties working as a salesman in one of the camp's shabby stores, has inherited his illegal status as undocumented refugee from his father, who came to Lebanon in the seventies. "When he died, it was like he had never been; he never existed anyway in the eyes of official agencies. I had to drop out of school when I was 15 -- as did my brothers and sisters -- because I was not allowed to attend government exams without the proper identification papers."

The young man was arrested several times at army checkpoints, but says he managed to free himself from the soldiers every time. "I have come to terms with the fact that I can only live and work in the camp; if not, I might be arrested and detained for several months like many others."

Although undocumented refugees share a socio-economic pattern with other Palestinians in Lebanon, they are more isolated than ordinary refugees.

Most non-ID refugees hold some proof of identity that could facilitate legalisation of their situation, because their Palestinian identity can be traced back to an authority once responsible for their documentation such as Jordan or Egypt. But since laws addressing Palestinian refugees have changed, non-IDs have been unable to claim an identity card from these countries of origin.

The current Lebanese government headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora has set up a Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue committee to address the issue of non-ID refugees. But it has a long way to go.

Many of the refugees expect little now. "I have decided to never marry," says Hassan. "Why should I expose my kids to this life of hardship and despair?"
 
 
(END/2007)

Decimering Palestijnse christenen dreigt

Geplaatst op donderdag 27 december 2007 07:36 , laatste wijziging donderdag 27 december 2007 07:38
 
 
 
De Palestijnen hebben het moeilijk, deels als gevolg van hun eigen intifada's. Maar Palestijnse christenen worden ook nog eens door hun eigen islamitische volksgenoten vervolgd. Daardoor zijn velen al geëmigreerd en dreigen vanouds christelijke Palestijnse steden, zoals Bethlehem en Nazareth, vrijwel geheel islamitisch te worden. De EU kan daar wat aan doen. Maar wil ze dat ook?
 
 
Bethlehem, de joodse geboorteplaats van Jezus Christus, had bijna 2000 jaar lang een hoofdzakelijk christelijke populatie. In de afgelopen decennia zakte deze echter van 80 procent christenen in 1948 naar minder dan 20 procent vandaag. Vergelijkbare cijfers gelden voor Nazareth, de plek waar Jezus opgroeide: 60 procent christenen in 1948, 40 procent in 1983, en minder dan 15 procent nu. Ramallah was in 1967 een bijna volledig christelijke stad, maar is op dit moment bijna volledig islamitisch. Het totale aantal christenen in de Palestijnse Autoriteit (Gaza/Westbank) is gezakt van 15 procent in 1948 tot minder dan 1,5 procent vandaag.

Uiteraard zijn er de moeilijke leefomstandigheden die voortkomen uit het Palestijnse geweld (twee intifada's) en de Israëlische contra-terreurmaatregelen, maar het hoofdprobleem voor christenen blijft de religieuze vervolging door moslims. Een gegeven dat niet is los te koppelen van het verval van alle Oosterse christenen in het gehele Midden-Oosten. Onder huidige omstandigheden zou een reeds gezakte populatie van 17 miljoen in 2000 zelfs verder dalen tot de helft in 2025. Oosterse christenen emigreren door de stijgende islamisering (zowel demografisch als politiek) en de eruit voortkomende vervolging en verdrukking. Dit in tegenstelling tot Israël, waar een populatie van 34.000 christenen in 1948 bijna vervijfvoudigd is tot 145.400 op dit moment. Dit dankzij de vrijheid en andere die Israël hen biedt.

Lobby
De meeste Palestijnse christenen beseffen heel goed het verschil tussen een joodse staat of joodse buren enerzijds en islamitische anderzijds. Zo lobbyde de christelijke burgemeester van Bethlehem, Elias Freij, tijdens de onderhandelingen over het Oslo II-akkoord (1995) om zijn stad niet aan de Palestijnse Autoriteit over te hevelen. En de leiders van de Armeense, Latijnse en Grieks-Orthodoxe kerken protesteerden tegen een geplande herverdeling van Jeruzalem door premier Barak in 2000. Veel christenen in Oost-Jeruzalem en Bethlehem hebben toen een Israëlisch paspoort aangevraagd. Velen durven niet openlijk te klagen, maar off the record praten ze vrijuit over de agressie en verdrukking waaraan hun gemeenschap is blootgesteld.

De vervolging van Oosterse christenen is niet te verklaren zonder de islamitische doctrine die elk gebied als islamitisch beschouwt dat ooit door jihad is veroverd. Het arabisch-nationalisme bouwt voort op deze ideologie door die gebieden te zien als het thuisland van de Arabische naties. Het Arabische probleem met Israël is dus niet dat van Arabische Palestijnen zonder eigen staat, maar van niet-moslims die een joodse staat gesticht hebben na eeuwen van islamitisch juk. Het probleem van Oosterse christenen in het Heilige Land is dat zij evenals Joden daar de oorspronkelijke bewoners zijn die dit Arabisch-islamitische suprematiedenken in de weg staan. Hun tweede probleem is de verdrukkende wetten van het traditionele shariarecht, en de cultuur van haat tegen andersgelovigen die het shariadenken genereert.

Emigratie
Vandaar bijvoorbeeld dat Jordanië tussen 1953 en 1967 het christelijke kwartier in het oude stadsgedeelte van Jeruzalem islamiseerde, met 60 procent emigratie als gevolg. Christenen werd verboden om huizen of land te kopen, scholen werden gesloten op moslimfeestdagen, moskeeën werden naast kerken gebouwd zodat deze niet meer konden worden vergroot. Vandaar dat Arafat Bethlehem en omgeving, de grootste enclave christenen in de Palestijnse Autoriteit, doelbewust islamiseerde door o.a. migratie van moslims aan te moedigen. Vandaar ook de boycot van christelijke zaken op de Westbank tijdens de tweede intifada. Vandaar de landroof, verkrachtingen, en gewelddaden door fanatieke moslims, die worden beschermd en gesteund door een islamitische overheid.

Vele westerse hulpverleningsorganisaties, Oxfam en Pax Christi bijvoorbeeld, verdoezelen dit weerkerend patroon van vervolging en verdrukking dat autochtone christenen in islamlanden ondergaan, terwijl ze voortdurend Israël afschilderen als brutale 'bezetter'. Het bewijst dat ze niet bezig zijn met het bestrijden van vervolging of verdrukking, maar wel met het bestrijden van Israël. Nationale overheden moeten de financiering aan hen herzien, en gangbare media moeten ophouden hen een ethisch of neutraal imago te bezorgen. Hetzelfde geldt voor de EU die met ons belastinggeld al jaren hoofdsponsor is van de Palestijnse Autoriteit en Palestijnse hulpverleningsorganisaties, die de vernietiging van Israël voorstaan, zonder dat daar één garantie of voordeel voor de EU tegenover staat. Men had voor die vele miljarden euro's best een apart statuut voor christenen kunnen bewerkstelligen, dat rekening houdt met hun historische rechten in de oudste geboorteplaatsen van het christendom. En als Israël bepaalde nederzettingen heeft afgebroken, kan de Palestijnse Autoriteit best de gedirigeerde migratie naar steden als Bethlehem omkeren.

In deze tijd van wereldwijd jihadgeweld, van Thailand tot Somalië, mag Europa zijn buitenlands beleid niet langer enten op Arabische obsessies die voortkomen uit diezelfde jihadideologie. We helpen enkel met het internationaliseren van een kleinschalig, regionaal grensconflict dat nauwelijks vermeldenswaardig is naast de vele zware conflicten van na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. En Europa als christelijke beschaving kan sowieso niet de vernietiging van weerloze christelijke gemeenschappen en heilige plaatsen blijven sponsoren.


Remi Hauman studeerde in Leuven en behaalde daar een licentiaat islamologie/arabistiek. Op zijn vakgebied heeft hij diverse publicaties op zijn naam staan.
 

Israëlische Arabieren: 78% tegen overdragen 'Arabische driehoek' aan Palestijnse staat

De 'Triangel' is een gebied in Israël, grenzend aan de Westelijke Jordaanoever, waar voornamelijk Arabieren wonen. De rechts-nationalistische Israel Beiteinu partij heeft voorgesteld dit gebied te ruilen voor de grote nederzettingenblokken, en dit dus aan de Palestijnse Autoriteit over te dragen in een vredesverdrag.
Uit meerdere enquetes komt steeds naar voren dat een grote meerderheid van de Israëlische Arabieren daartegen is.
 
 
Ratna
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Poll of Arabs in Israel:
78%:18% Oppose transfer of Triangle to PA,
35% Don't plan to vote in Knesset elections if held now
Dr. Aaron Lerner
Date: 27 December 2007

Telephone poll of a sample of 450 adult Arabs residing in the Galilee, Triangle and Negev (all in Israel) carried out for and published by the Al-Sennara newspaper (details per press release in Hebrew):

Do you support transferring the Triangle to the Palestinian Authority?
Favor 18%
Oppose 78%

What party would you vote for if elections held now?
Hadash 18%
Ra`am-Ta`al 15%
National Democratic Assembly 6%
Labor 8%
Won't vote for any party 35% [rest refuse reply]

Who is your favorite MK?
Ahmad Tibi 27%
Mohammad Barakeh 16%
[Azmi Bishara was the third most popular MK (% not indicated) though has not been an MK for half a year]
 
 
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Website: http://www.imra.org.il

Geen nieuwe bouwplannen voor de Westelijke Jordaanoever

Het blijft onduidelijk of en waar Israël nog bouwt op de Westelijke Jordaanoever.
 
Terwijl men vasthoudt aan het recht bestaande (en reeds goedgekeurde en aanbestede) plannen nog uit te voeren, is meermaals verklaard geen nieuwe projecten meer te starten, waarbij dan weer een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen Jeruzalem en de Westoever, of tussen de grote blokken en de rest, of tussen nederzettingen aan deze en gene zijde van de afscheidingsbarriere. En mag in de nederzettingen die worden uitgesloten van uitbreiding, wel nog voor natuurlijke groei van de bevolking worden gebouwd?
 
Het mag niet verbazen dat dit alles weinig vertrouwen wekt bij de Palestijnen en bij de internationale gemeenschap. Israël dient een duidelijk signaal af te geven dat men het merendeel van de Westoever niet van plan is te houden, en dat kan alleen door daar geheel met bouwen te stoppen en zelfs nederzettingen te ontruimen. Ik begrijp dat Israël de grote blokken wil houden, maar men vergroot de kans daarop niet met voortgaande bouw terwijl wordt geprobeerd de vredesonderhandelingen nieuw leven in te blazen. Ondertussen schijnt defensieminister Barak sinds zijn aantreden geen enkele vergunning voor nieuwe bouwplannen te hebben afgegeven, maar dat heeft - in tegenstelling tot de geplande uitbreiding van Har Homa - onze kranten en het journaal niet gehaald.
 
 
Ratna
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'No new W. Bank building tenders'
JPost.com staff and AP , THE JERUSALEM POST Dec. 27, 2007
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1198517227877&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

There will be no new building tenders issued for construction in West Bank settlements and the east Jerusalem neighborhood of Har Homa, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert pledged Thursday during a meeting between Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams in Jerusalem, Army Radio reported.

The Har Homa expansion has been a major stumbling block in the peace process which was kick-started at the Annapolis conference, and while the prime minister vowed that no new tenders would be issued for the east Jerusalem neighborhood, he insisted that tenders already approved could not be canceled.

The two negotiating teams included Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and PA negotiators Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) and Saeb Erekat.

It was the first meeting involving Olmert and Abbas since the Annapolis summit.

Erekat said Abbas stressed the need to stop all settlement activities in order to facilitate the talks on a final peace accord. Although Erekat reported no progress on narrowing the gaps between the two sides, both sides described the two-hour meeting, held at Olmert's official residence, as "positive."

Army Radio gave an even more optimistic account of the talks, saying that the two sides agreed to leave the Har Homa issue behind them and continue with negotiations toward a final settlement.

The negotiating teams also vowed to begin serious discussions on the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in talks scheduled for next week. It was also announced that Olmert and Abbas would follow up those discussions with a meeting in two weeks' time.

Meanwhile, Army Radio reported that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, concerned over the lack of real progress since Annapolis, telephoned Olmert and Abbas on Wednesday night, urging them to overcome their differences and move the peace process forward.

Before Thursday's negotiations began, Hamas pronounced the meeting a "waste of time."

"Olmert and his government continue their daily aggressions against our people, continue to build settlements, and don't recognize Palestinian political and national rights," the group said.

Volkstelling Gazastrook hervat na toestemming Hamas

Hoeveel mensen wonen er nou precies in de Gazastrook?
 
Een paar jaar geleden had men het over een miljoen, en op een gegeven moment begonnen de kranten anderhalf miljoen te schrijven, wat op een wel erg grote bevolkingsgroei zou duiden... In feite weten de kranten het gewoon niet precies, en eigenlijk niemand, maar daar komt binnenkort verandering in, want Hamas heeft eindelijk toegestemd in een volkstelling in de Gazastrook.
 
Volkstellingen liggen gevoelig bij de Palestijnen. Enerzijds zijn er rechtse Israëli's die hopen dat zo aangetoond wordt dat Israël ook met de bezette gebieden een stevige Joodse meerderheid houdt. Zij beweren dat de Palestijnen de bevolkingscijfers bewust overdrijven. Anderzijds menen de meeste mensen in Israël dat Israël niet Joods en democratisch kan blijven als het de bezette gebieden zou houden, en dat is een krachtig argument tegen de bezetting.
 
Dat het Palestijnse Bureau voor de Statistiek jarenlang te hoge cijfers aangaf klopt waarschijnlijk wel. Die cijfers waren gebaseerd op een telling uit de jaren '90 en nooit bijgestelde prognoses die destijds uitgingen van een onafhankelijke staat vanaf 1999 waarheen Palestijnen zouden terugkeren, terwijl er feitelijk sinds de tweede intifada een negatief migratiesaldo is. Ook het geboortecijfer zou zijn gedaald.
 
Los van de precieze uitkomst lijkt het duidelijk dat de bevolkingsgroei in Gaza onhoudbaar is, en een levensvatbare staat ook zonder Israëlische beperkingen onmogelijk maakt. Hopelijk zwengelt de census de discussie over geboortecontrole en andere maatregelen tegen de bevolkingsgroei aan, en dat is waarschijnlijk ook waarom Hamas er tegen is.
 
 
Ratna & Wouter
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Gaza census renewed after Hamas agrees to use of data 
By Amira Hass 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/938755.html
 
 
Employees of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics began collecting data Monday for a population census in the Gaza Strip after a hiatus of several weeks. In August, the PCBS began a comprehensive survey of populations, economic enterprises, homes and other buildings in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

In late November, the Hamas government in Gaza established a committee to monitor the census-takers' activities in the strip and demanded that it receive all of the collected data in advance.

PCBS director Dr. Louay Shabaneh refused the request, on the grounds that the PCBS is not a political organization and owes allegiance only to the Palestinian Authority government in Ramallah.

In response, the Hamas government closed the PCBS offices and halted work on the census. This week an agreement was reached that has allowed the census to continue, with the mediation of Dr. Mustafa Barghouti and two United Nations agencies.

On Monday, nine days after data collection in the West Bank was completed, 1,600 census takers began working in Gaza. The census is expected to take two weeks.

The agreement marks the first time since the Hamas takeover of Gaza last June, that the government has climbed down after flexing its muscles in the face of an important PA institution.

Barghouti, who in January 2006 was a PA presidential candidate, says the PCBS asked him to mediate in the dispute. Barghouti, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and a minister in the former PA unity government, was joined by UNFPA, the UN Population Fund, and UNSCO, the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East.

The agreement stipulates that PCBS will collect and analyze the data and the results "will be submitted to everyone, including people in Gaza," Barghouti said.

The $8.6 million cost of the census is being underwritten by the PA, the UN, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the OPEC states. Shabaneh said yesterday that the mediation effort succeeded after he and his fellow mediators explained that the PCBS is an independent, nonpolitical, nonpartisan institution that provides services to the entire Palestinian public.

The data that is collective is always available to everyone and is posted on the organization's Web site. Shabaneh said the census takers were welcomed warmly into the homes they have visited in Gaza during their first two days of work there.

vrijdag 28 december 2007

Israël is "bezet Palestina" volgens Syrisch persbureau

De tijden dat Israël in de Arabische wereld de 'Zionistische entiteit' of 'bezet Palestina' heette, zijn helaas nog geen verleden tijd.

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Number of 'Immigrants' to Occupied Palestine Lowest in 20 Years
Monday, December 24, 2007 - 03:30 PM
www.sana. sy/eng/22/2007/12/24/154136.htm
[The Syrian news agency]


Occupied Jerusalem, (A.F.P.) - The figures published by the Israeli 'ministry of absorption' on Monday revealed that the number of those who arrived into occupied Palestine this year had declined to its lowest record in 20 years.

The figures disclosed that the number of what they called 'newcomers' were only 19,700 people in 2007, down six percent from 2006.

Ahmad Fathi ZAHRA


--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website:
www.imra.org.il

Joseph en Maria in Bethlehem

In Nederland zijn United Civilians for Peace en (de daarbij aangesloten) Pax Christi en IKV goede voorbeelden van de hieronder genoemde eenzijdige focus op Israëls (mis)daden.
Wie dezer dagen zo graag Joseph en Maria bij de 'Apartheidsmuur' afbeelden op alternatieve kerstkaarten, zouden zich ook eens mogen afvragen hoe veilig het stel in hedendaags Bethlehem zou kunnen vertoeven (zonder Israëlische bescherming).
In tegenstelling tot de moderne linkse misvatting was Jezus namelijk geen Palestijn maar een Jood.
 
 
Ratna & Wouter
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Op-Ed: Good will to all mankind - Unless you're Israeli
Dan Kosky - 
www.ngo-monitor.org
December 26, 2007
For annotated item including illustration:
www.ngo-monitor.org/article.php?operation=print&id=1739

There is something predictable about Christmas time - Fairy lights in the high street, seasonal music in the shops, and the arrival of a small envelope in your letter box, asking for a donation, often to Christian based charities such as War on Want and Christian Aid.  Sadly, this appeal for festive generosity is intrinsically linked to a more recent Christmas trend - the blanket condemnation and demonization of Israel.

A similar theme every year describes how Bethlehem, the historical and theological epicentre of Christmas, is a 'ghetto' under siege by the brutal Israeli occupation and the 'apartheid wall'. This one-sided narrative and highly charged rhetoric not only ignores the very real context of terror, internal Palestinian conflict and the persecution of Palestinian Christians, but it also reveals a cynical exploitation of Christian sensibilities for crude political gain.  Worryingly, some of the worst offenders are the supposedly apolitical Christian based charities, who de-legitimise Israel, while at the same time raising funds for their 'Christmas Campaign.'

This year, if you wish to donate to War on Want, you can simply visit their website, where you can purchase highly politicized Christmas cards (10 for GBP 4). The card depicts Joseph and a heavily pregnant Mary, unable to reach Bethlehem, due to "Israel's Separation Wall and a state-of-the-art military checkpoint." The suggestion of deicide is only a small step away.
Meanwhile, another Christian based charity, the Amos Trust is marketing 'poignant, ironic' nativity scenes, manufactured in Bethlehem, in which an unmistakable high wall means that "this year the wise men won't get to the stable."  Churches are urged to spend GBP 50 on a larger version of the model, to spread this distorted message to the masses.

Unfortunately, such Israel-bashing is not just for Christmas - it continues all year long.  As NGO Monitor's research has consistently revealed, Christian Aid works closely with replacement theologians such as Rev Naim Ateek, who compares Israel's treatment of the Palestinians to the crucifixion of Jesus. Until recently, the entire 'conflict' section of the Christian Aid website was devoted to the plight of the Palestinians - as if there were no other conflicts in the world, and as if Israel has no right of defence against terror.  Meanwhile, War on Want not only accuses Israel of a 'campaign of apartheid,' but enthusiastically supports the boycott campaign against the Jewish state.

The mandate of these NGOs is to fight poverty, hunger and disease - All noble aims, which are being seriously undermined by their obsessive condemnation of Israel.  Only when the same standards are applied to all countries, in accordance with true universal human rights values, will the likes of Christian Aid and War on Want be considered credible vehicles for social change. Until then, the exploitation of Christmas continues and we should all think twice when that small envelope arrives in our letter box.

Dan Kosky is Communications Director of NGO Monitor.
This oped will be published in the Jewish News (London) this week

Hamas controleert tunnels: wapens, explosieven en sigaretten toegestaan, drugs niet

Een einde aan de wapensmokkel zou een voorwaarde moeten zijn voor iedere samenwerking met Hamas, en voor een eventueel staakt-het-vuren tussen Israël en de Hamas.
 
Terwijl er tekort zou zijn aan essentiële levensmiddelen en medicijnen, zijn er zoveel geweren dat die niet langer worden 'geimporteerd'.
Vreemde wereld in Gaza.
 
 
Ratna
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Hamas controls tunnels: weapons, explosives and cigarettes allowed - not drugs
Dr. Aaron Lerner  26 December 2007

Israel Radio Arab Affairs Correspondent Gal Berger reported on the morning news magazine that Hamas now completely controls the smuggling tunnels running from the Egyptian Sinai to the Gaza Strip after closing down smugglers who refused to cooperate.

Hamas requires the smugglers to provide detailed reports of the smuggling activity and has imposed restrictions on the smuggling of drugs.

While weapons, ammunition and explosives are being "imported" via the tunnels, Berger notes that assault rifles are not currently being smuggled in since "there are so many of them in the Gaza Strip that they could be exported."


--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website:
www.imra.org.il

Volgens 46% Israëli's Peres man van het jaar; volgens 44% Katzav verliezer van het jaar

Misschien hadden ze ook naar de vrouw van het jaar moeten vragen en had Livni dan een kans gemaakt, of natuurlijk één of andere soapster, want van de Israëlische politiek wordt je niet erg vrolijk. Vorig jaar was de vraag wat de gebeurtenis van het jaar was een heel stuk makkelijker te beantwoorden, en dat was niet te verkiezen boven dit saaie jaar.

Ratna
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Polls: 46% Peres man of the year 44% Katzav loser of the year
Dr. Aaron Lerner
Date: 27 December 2007

Telephone poll of a representative sample of 528 adult Israelis (including Arab Israelis) carried out by Maagar Mohot Survey Institute (headed by Professor Yitzchak Katz for Israel Radio's "Its all Talk" on 26 December 2007. 
 
Statistical error +/- 4.5 percentage points.

Of the following who is man of the year?
Olmert 10%
Barak 4%
Netanyahu 10%
Peres 46%
Other 30%

What was the event of the year?
Annapolis 9%
Winograd interim report 8%
Sept. 9 IAF attack in Syria (according to foreign press) 26%
High school and university strike 42%
Conflict between minister of justice and Supreme Court president Beinish 5%
Other 10%

Who was the loser of the year?
Abraham Hirchson 9%
Amir Peretz 25%
Moshe Katzav 44%
Other 22%
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Website:
http://www.imra.org.il

Israëlische Arabieren willen in meerderheid Israëlisch staatsburger blijven

De meeste Arabieren in Israël willen Israëlisch staatsburger blijven na de creatie van een Palestijnse staat. Dit is niks nieuws, maar gezien de toenemende agitatie tegen Israël door met name de leiders van de Arabische gemeenschap in Israël, is het wel opmerkelijk. Velen zien zichzelf meer als Palestijn dan als Israëli, en zijn tegen het voortbestaan van het huidige Israël.
 
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Israeli Arabs prefer remainig Israeli citizens over PA citizenship 62%:14%
Dr. Aaron Lerner 26 December, 2007

Poll Methodology Representative sample 514 Israeli Arabs Over 18 years old
Phone calls: 3-5 Dec. 2007
+ - 4.5% margin of error. 
KEEVOON Research, Strategy & Communications. www.keevoon.com

1. "There has been a lot of talk lately about the formation of a new Palestinian State.  It has been suggested by some that Israeli Arabs could continue to live in Israel, but change their citizenship to the new Palestinian State.  Given the choice, and continuing to live where you presently live today, would you prefer to be a citizen of Israel or of a new Palestinian State?"

Remain Israeli citizens 62% Join a future Palestinian State 14%
No opinion or refused to answer 24%

The strongest support for remaining citizens of Israel was exhibited by members of the Druse community, 84% of whom would choose Israel.  Lower income households also showed strong support with 71% of them choosing Israel.  Men were more likely than women to choose to remain Israeli citizens (67% vs. 56%).  The strongest support for becoming citizens of a future Palestinian State was among students with 21% as opposed to the average of 14%.   The largest percentage of undecided citizens was among Christian Arab Israelis with 43% compared to the average of 24%.

2. Among Olmert, Barak or Netanyahu, who is more likely to make peace with the Palestinian Authority and Israel's neighbors.
Barak 18% Olmert 8% Netanyahu 7% None of them 36% No opinion or refused to answer 28%

Barak's greatest support is among the Druse with 29%.  Netanyahu's greatest support is among residents of the Negev (22%) and 45-55 year olds (19%).
47% of Christian Arabs and students didn't know or refused to answer this question.


--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website:
www.imra.org.il

Hamas TV kinderprogramma bezingt martelaarschap en bevrijding Tiberias

Uit het kinderprogramma van Hamas TV:
 
"Award your victory to those who sacrifice themselves. This is your wedding, oh martyr.
   May all the martyrs be resurrected, and we will celebrate this day.
   Award your victory to those who sacrifices themselves. This is your wedding, oh martyr.
   We saw the joy in the eyes of the children. Oh Gaza, make that joy grow,
   when this homeland is liberated from Tiberias to Anaba,
   when this homeland is liberated from Tiberias to Anaba.
   We liberated Gaza by force, not by Oslo or by Taba –
   but with my steadfast people, and with its blazing fire."
 
Saraa Tells Kids "We Can All be Sacrificed for the Sake of the Homeland"
 
Voor de duidelijkheid: Tiberias ligt niet in de bezette gebieden, maar in Israël.
Het lijkt me niet echt een toepasselijke opmerking naar kinderen dat zij allen geofferd kunnen worden voor het vaderland, waarbij dit vaderland bovendien het grondgebied van een soevereine door de VN erkende staat omvat. Ik vraag me af of Martijn van Dam, Mariko Peters en Harry van Bommel, allen voorstanders van een dialoog met Hamas, dit verantwoorde kinderkost vinden. Zo niet, dan kunnen zij daar Hamas in een volgend bezoek wellicht eens kritisch over aanspreken.
 
 
Ratna
----------------

Below are excerpts from a song performed by child TV host Saraa Barhoum, which aired on Al-Aqsa TV on December 20, 2007. Following that are excerpts from the children's show hosted by Saraa Barhoum, "Pioneers of Tomorrow," which also aired on Al-Aqsa TV on December 20, 2007.

Past episodes of "Pioneers of Tomorrow" featured Mickey Mouse-lookalike character Farfour, who was "martyred" on the show in June 2007 and was replaced by Nahoul the bee.


Saraa Sings: "Oh Gaza... Let Your Lighthouse Illuminate the Sea Of Blood"

Saraa Barhoum: "We liberated Gaza by force, not by Oslo or by Taba –
   but with my steadfast people, and with its blazing fire.
   We liberated Gaza by force, not by Oslo or by Taba –
   but with my steadfast people, and with its blazing fire.
   Rafah sings, and the Kalashnikov replies.
   Rafah sings, and the Kalashnikov replies.
   We, who know no fear, are the lions of the jungle.
   Look how beautiful our Gaza is. We crowned it with a laurel wreath.
   We have proven that with our will, we can defeat the colonialist army.
   Look how beautiful our Gaza is. We crowned it with a laurel wreath.
   We have proven that with our will, we can defeat the colonialist army.
   We have regained our freedom through bloodshed and the wrath of fire.
   We came out on the day of liberations to celebrate our pride – hurrah!
   We came out on the day of liberations to celebrate our pride – hurrah!"[...]
   Oh Gaza, the first stone [of the Intifada], where we celebrated our victory –
   raise your sail for the sailors, and let your lighthouse illuminate the sea of blood.
   Oh Gaza, the first stone [of the Intifada], where we celebrated our victory –
   raise your sail for the sailors, and let your lighthouse illuminate the sea of blood.
   If we receive good tidings, we will meet our death with no hesitation.
   We are the swords of Allah, we are the victorious armies.
   We are the swords of Allah, we are the victorious armies."[...]
   May all the martyrs be resurrected, and we will celebrate this day."


"Award Your Victory to Those Who Sacrifice Themselves, This is Your Wedding, Oh Martyr"

"Award your victory to those who sacrifice themselves. This is your wedding, oh martyr.
   May all the martyrs be resurrected, and we will celebrate this day.
   Award your victory to those who sacrifices themselves. This is your wedding, oh martyr.
   We saw the joy in the eyes of the children. Oh Gaza, make that joy grow,
   when this homeland is liberated from Tiberias to Anaba,
   when this homeland is liberated from Tiberias to Anaba.
   We liberated Gaza by force, not by Oslo or by Taba –
   but with my steadfast people, and with its blazing fire."


Saraa Tells Kids "We Can All be Sacrificed for the Sake of the Homeland"

Saraa, child host: "Nahoul, don't you want to convey your holiday greetings on the Feast of the Sacrifice?"

Nahoul, a giant bee: "Convey greetings, Saraa?"

Saraa: "Yes."

Nahoul: "Who should I convey greetings to, Saraa? Should I convey greetings to my brother, who was martyred in the first Intifada, at the hands of the Zionist Jews? Should I convey greetings to my second brother, who was martyred in the second Intifada? Should I convey greetings to my wounded brother, to my aunt, who was martyred because of the siege, or to her orphans? Who is there for me to greet, Saraa? I won't greet anyone. I am so sad, Saraa."

[...]

Saraa: "Don't be sad, Nahoul."

Nahoul: "I won't even convey greetings to my mother, who suffers from diabetes, or to my father, who suffers from hepatitis C. Who should I convey greetings to, Saraa? You're rubbing salt in my wounds."

Saraa: "Don't be sad, Nahoul. We can all be sacrificed for the sake of the homeland. May Allah help you. All we can say is that we place our trust in Allah against the enemies."

Nahoul: "We place our trust in Allah."

[...]

Saraa: "Hadil, did you slaughter a sheep today?"

Hadil, on the phone: "No, a calf."

Nahoul: "A calf, wow! Who did you share the calf with, after you slaughtered it?"

Hadil: "And what did you slaughter?"

Nahoul: "We didn't get to slaughter anything because we are poor and miserable. What did you do with the meat of the calf?"

Hadil: "We gave it to poor people, to the miserable, and to our relatives, and we took some home."

Nahoul: "Wow! Well done. She knows and understands it all, Saraa."

[...]

Saraa: "How old are you, Yaqin?"

Yaqin, on the phone: "I am 13 years old."

Nahoul: "Wow!"

Saraa: "13 is big."

Nahoul: "Yaqin, I want to ask you a question."

Yaqin: "Go ahead."

Nahoul: "Let's say we got a calf on the night before the holiday. We kept the calf because we wanted to slaughter it after the holiday prayer. We went to slaughter the calf, but we found it dead. What should we do?"

Yaqin: "Buy a sheep."

Nahoul: "But what if we don't... But what if we don't have enough money?"

Yaqin: "It's the thought that counts."

Nahoul: "Great. That's brilliant. What's her name?"

Saraa: "Yaqin."

Nahoul: "Yaqin from Gaza."


*********************
To view this Special Dispatch in HTML, visit:
http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD179307 .
 
* To view the clip from "Pioneers of Tomorrow," visit:
http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1639.htm
* To view the clip of the song by host Saraa Barhoum, visit:
http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1637.htm
* To view the MEMRI TV page on Al-Aqsa TV, visit:
http://memritv.org/content/en/tv_channel_indiv.htm?id=175
* To view the MEMRI TV page on indoctrination of children, visit:
http://www.memritv.org/subject/en/178.htm

*********************
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent, non-profit organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle East.
Copies of articles and documents cited, as well as background information, are available on request.

MEMRI holds copyrights on all translations. Materials may only be used with proper attribution.

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
P.O. Box 27837, Washington, DC 20038-7837
Search previous MEMRI publications at www.memri.org

donderdag 27 december 2007

Christenen onder druk in Gaza en Bethlehem

Het vertrek van steeds meer christenen uit de Palestijnse gebieden wordt vaak Israël aangewreven (zoals alles), maar is in de eerste plaats een gevolg van de opkomst van het intolerante islamisme van Hamas en co. Niet iedereen geeft dat toe: het is minder gevaarlijk om Israël de schuld te geven dan de moslimextremisten.
 
De afname van het aantal christenen zou ook worden veroorzaakt door een lager geboortecijfer, en het zou voor hen makkelijker en/of aantrekkelijker zijn om een betere toekomst te zoeken in het Westen, zoals de kinderen van de burgemeester van Bethlehem. Een klein lichtpuntje is dat het toerisme naar Bethlehem de laatste jaren weer aantrekt.
 
 
Wouter
__________________________________
 
Gaza / Christenen doelwit militanten
Moord op werknemer Bijbelgenootschap in Gaza

In Gaza, waar de radicale Hamas het voor het zeggen heeft, wordt het steeds onveiliger voor christenen. Ook in andere plaatsen zoals Bethlehem, zien christenen zich gedwongen te vluchten.

In de summier ingerichte flat doet Pauline Ajad haar verhaal, sec, met ingehouden emotie. Daarvoor heeft ze voor de camera geposeerd, een kind op de arm, foto van haar echtgenoot Rami in de hand. Rami werkte in Gaza voor het christelijke Bijbelgenootschap. Tot hij werd ontvoerd, gemarteld en doodgeschoten.

„Het was donderdag, vier oktober", vertelt Pauline. „Rami kwam thuis en zei dat hij gevolgd was door een auto met een onleesbaar kenteken. Toen zijn broer ging kijken, reed de auto met drie bebaarde inzittenden weg. Maar later stond 'ie weer voor de deur. Twee dagen later, zaterdag, belde Rami, hij was nog even een boodschap doen, maar zou zo thuis zijn. 's Avonds belde hij, en klonk angstig. Hij zei dat hij ver weg was, in gezelschap, en laat zou zijn, maar misschien ook niet meer zou terugkeren. De volgende ochtend vonden ze zijn lichaam op straat. Hij was neergestoken en meerdere malen in zijn hoofd geschoten."

De enige uitleg die Pauline (30) heeft, is dat Rami is gedood omdat hij christen was. „Achteraf waren er tekenen aan de wand. Twee maanden eerder was een sjeik op Rami afgestapt die zei: ik kan je tot de islam bekeren. Rami had geantwoord dat hij overtuigd christen is. De man had gewaarschuwd dat Rami hier nog spijt van zou krijgen."

Na de moord vluchtte Pauline met haar twee kleine kinderen naar de Westoever, naar een voorstadje van Bethlehem, waar de werkgevers van Rami voor haar een flat hebben gehuurd. Maar ze wil terug naar Gaza. „Daar ben ik geboren en getogen, daar heb ik mijn familie en vrienden." Is ze niet bang? „Nee, ik denk dat de dood van Rami voorbestemd was en ook mijn lot ligt vast."

Volgens een Israëlische krant zouden de kidnappers zijn opgepakt. Ze zouden behoren tot de beweging van de salafieten die de 'christelijke kruisvaarders' willen verdrijven. Vele christenen zijn, na meerdere incidenten, al uit Gaza vertrokkken. Maar ook Bethlehem op de Westoever zou volgens sommige christenen al minder veilig zijn. De eigenaar van een christelijke tv-zender heeft zijn station onlangs gesloten. „Het geld was op", zo benadrukt hij en haalt uit naar een Israëlische krant die had geschreven dat hij door moslims was bedreigd. „Schrijf dat alsjeblieft niet, het heeft me zoveel ellende gegeven, het is gevaarlijk voor me." Hij weigert uit te weiden.

Op het stadhuis in Bethlehem ontkent burgemeester Victor Batarseh in alle toonaarden dat ook in zijn stad christenen klagen over groeiende druk en dreigementen van islamitische zijde.

Het Palestijns gezag heeft per decreet vastgelegd dat in Bethlehem en nog negen andere plaatsen de burgemeester een christen moet zijn, ook al is door het vertrek van de christenen een meerderheid van Bethlehem moslim. De emigratie van de christenen uit zijn stad wijt Bataseh aan de Israëlische oppressie. „Mijn eigen kinderen zijn naar Californië vertrokken omdat ze hier geen toekomst hebben." Ik heb zelf enige tijd in de VS gewoond, maar ben toch maar weer teruggekeerd. Ik ben hier een gerespecteerd burger en heb nog nooit iets van islamitische dreigingen of van discriminatie gemerkt."

De 73-jarige burgervader is fel tegen het Hamasbewind in Gaza en tegen iedere vermenging van godsdienst en staat. Bevreesd dat Hamas uiteindelijk zijn macht over de Westoever zal uitbreiden is hij niet. „Maar we moeten waakzaam blijven."

 

Terroristische cel in Nablus opgerold

De strenge Israëlische veiligheidsmaatregelen slagen erin bijna alle Palestijnse aanslagen te voorkomen. Onlangs werden de daders gepakt van een aanval nabij Ariel op 24 oktober, waarbij 2 gewonden waren gevallen. De daders hadden ook een eerdere aanval met 2 doden op hun geweten.
 
________________________

IDF AND ISA UNCOVER NABLUS TERRORIST CELL
(Communicated by the Prime Minister's Office)
Tuesday, 25 December, 2007

In the past month, the IDF and the ISA uncovered a terrorist cell whose members are connected to the Hamas terrorist infrastructure in Nablus. The terrorists admitted that they perpetrated several shooting attacks against Israeli targets in Nablus and in the surrounding areas, including the 24.10.07 shooting attack at Ariel junction, in which an Israeli civilian was lightly wounded and an IDF soldier was seriously wounded. In addition, they admitted responsibility for the 7.1.05 shooting attack near Migdalim in which two IDF soldiers were killed (see below).

During the investigation, the members of the terrorist cell disclosed their involvement in the 24.10.07 attack, in which they opened fire from a passing vehicle, targeting an Israeli civilian and an IDF soldier at Ariel junction in Samaria. In addition, the men divulged that several days previously, they carried out advance reconnaissance and observation activities of the area in which they intended to perpetrate the attack. The planning stages included the purchase of a GMC vehicle with Israeli license plates for use during the attack.

Abdallah Kuka, 19, who drove the vehicle; Amin Kuka, 32; and A'mar Tanbur, 23, were the three Nablus terrorists who perpetrated the attack. Other members of the terrorist cell involved in the attack were Riad Arafat, 34, who functioned as the reconnaissance observer, and Suhil Kuka, 21, who aided the cell after the attack was carried out. On 24.10.07, the terrorists arrived at the Ariel junction bus stop and opened fire from short range at the waiting people. One Israeli civilian was lightly wounded and one Israeli soldier was seriously wounded. After the attack, the vehicle continued driving eastward and continued shooting at the vehicles traveling nearby, lightly wounding one Israeli civilian and damaging several vehicles. The terrorists escaped towards Jamma'in village, south of Nablus, where they set fire to the vehicle and continued their escape in a taxi that had been ordered in advance.

The members of the terrorist cell also admitted responsibility for the 7.1.05 shooting attack near Migdalim. Amin Kuka and Suhil Kuka, dressed in IDF uniforms, stopped a vehicle and opened fire at the Israeli passengers inside. Two IDF soldiers were killed in the attack and two other soldiers were lightly wounded. St.-Sgt. Yosef Atia, the soldier who drove the car, was killed, as was 2nd Lt. Ariel Buda, who was severely wounded and died of his wounds on 15.10.05. Terrorists Abdallah Kuka, Riad Arafat and Ala'a A'num were also involved in planning the attack.

The exposure of the terrorist cell and the incriminating evidence uncovered against it, indicate that despite its pretensions to the contrary, Hamas operatives are - at present - intensively planning to perpetrate attacks against Israelis in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip, as well as in Israel proper. Hamas's actions are manifested in the planning of terrorist attacks, and the maintaining of attack capability and organizational strength, all of which are designed to strengthen Hamas as the leader of Palestinian terrorism.


--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website:
www.imra.org.il

dinsdag 25 december 2007

IDF voert tijdens Kerstperiode geen operaties uit in Bethlehem

Het aantal toeristen dat Bethlehem bezoekt zal dit jaar naar verwachting 2x zo hoog uitvallen als in 2006. Dat is goed nieuws voor de Palestijnse economie, die sinds de Tweede Intifadah en de Israëlische maatregelen die daarop volgden, in een diep dal is gestort.
 
Een vreedzame en veilige Palestijnse staat zou een bloeiende toeristenindustrie kunnen krijgen, want het land is vol met Bijbelse plaatsen die zowel Joden als christenen graag willen bezoeken. Helaas lijkt dit voorlopig nog (verre?) toekomstmuziek.
 
----------
IDF scales back Bethlehem ops for Xmas
Yaakov Katz , THE JERUSALEM POST Dec. 24, 2007
www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847414197&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

The IDF began scaling back its operations in Bethlehem and the city's outlying areas on Sunday ahead of the expected arrival of more than 60,000 Christian pilgrims to the city in the next few days to participate in Christmas celebrations.

Thousands of pilgrims and tourists began crossing from Jerusalem into Bethlehem on Sunday and the IDF said that it would pull its forces out of the city and suspend operations there. Central Command sources said the IDF usually enters Bethlehem every night to search for wanted terror suspects.

"We do not want to ruin the tourism industry and want to allow the Palestinians the opportunity to enjoy and benefit from the holiday season," said a top officer from the IDF's Judea and Samaria Division.

Instead of hunting down terror suspects, forces from the IDF's Etzion Brigade will guard the entranceway to Bethlehem and will coordinate security developments there with Palestinian Authority security forces.

Some 340,000 tourists have crossed from Israel into Bethlehem since the beginning of the year, in comparison to the 200,000 who visited the city in 2006.
Palestinians estimate that by the end of the year 400,000 tourists will have visited Bethlehem.

To get to Bethlehem, tourists must cross through a large army checkpoint - called Checkpoint 300 - at Israel's West Bank security barrier.
The area was the scene of violent gunfights during the peak of the second intifada.

The Tourism Ministry has spent thousands of dollars on decorations to make tourists feel more welcome, and workers at visitor centers will hand out candy and welcome letters to the pilgrims.

While the IDF will scale back its operations over the next few days, the officer said it was possible that a lone Palestinian terrorist would try to ruin the festive atmosphere by perpetrating an attack in the city.

"Nothing can ensure this won't happen," the officer said, adding that overall the PA's interest was to maintain peace and quiet in the city during this tourist season.

Israel is allowing 500 Christians from the Gaza Strip to enter Israel and the West Bank for up to one month during the Christmas season.

AP contributed to the report.

Christenen in Gaza houden zich gedeist deze Kerstmis

Sinds Hamas aan de macht is voelen de 3.000 christenen in de Gazastrook zich niet meer veilig. Zo werd de christelijke bibliotheek verwoest, de eigenaar van de christelijke boekwinkel vermoord en zijn winkel in brand gestoken. De christelijke hooglerares Sana al-Sayegh van Gaza City's Palestine International University zou afgelopen zomer zijn ontvoerd en gedwongen met een moslim te trouwen en zich te bekeren.
 
Hamas zegt de christelijke minderheid te respecteren en te beschermen, maar de christenen zijn er niet meer gerust op, en steeds meer families vertrekken naar de Westelijke Jordaanoever.
 
----------

Last update - 21:19 23/12/2007

Gaza's Christians keep low Christmas profile after activist slain
By The Associated Press

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/937474.html

Gaza's tiny Christian community is keeping a low profile during Christmas this year, traumatized by the killing of a prominent activist after Hamas' takeover of the coastal territory.

Few Christmas trees are on display, churches are holding austere services and hundreds of Christians hope to travel to the West Bank to celebrate the holiday in Bethlehem. Many say they don't plan on returning to Gaza.

"We have a very sad Christmas," said Essam Farah, acting pastor of Gaza's Baptist Church, which has canceled its annual children's party because of the grim atmosphere.

About 3,000 Christians live in Gaza, an overwhelmingly conservative Muslim society of 1.5 million people. The two religions have generally had cordial relations over the years.

That relationship has been shaken since Hamas seized control of Gaza last June and especially following the recent death of 32-year-old Rami Ayyad.

Ayyad, a member of the Baptist Church, managed Gaza's only Christian bookstore and was involved in many charitable activities. He was found shot in the head, his body thrown on a Gaza street in early October, 10 hours after he was kidnapped from the store.

He regularly received death threats from people angry about his perceived missionary work - a rarity among Gaza's Christians - and the store was firebombed six months before the kidnapping.

No group claimed responsibility for the killing, and no one has openly accused Hamas of persecution. But Christians fear that the Hamas takeover, along with the lack of progress in finding Ayyad's killers, has emboldened Islamic extremists.

Hamas has tried to calm jittery Christians with reassuring handshakes and official visits promising justice.

"Hamas will not spare any effort to find the culprits of this crime and bring them to justice," said spokesman Fawzi Barhoum. He insisted the killing was simply a crime and not religiously motivated.

At the Baptist Church on Sunday, just 10 people attended the regular weekly prayer service, down from an average of 70. There was no Christmas tree in sight.

Farah said the church's full-time pastor, along with his family and 12 employees of Ayyad's store relocated to the West Bank to wait out the tense atmosphere. Farah said he prayed for forgiveness and love among Muslims and Christians.

Community leaders say an unprecedented number of Christian families are already migrating from Gaza - rattled by the religious tensions and tough economic sanctions Israel imposed on the area after the Hamas takeover.

While no official statistics were available, signs of the flight are evident. Rev. Manuel Musallem, head of Gaza's Roman Catholic Church, said he alone knows of seven families that sold their properties and left the area, and 15 more that are preparing to do the same.

Musallem blamed Israeli sanctions and excessive violence in Gaza for the flight.

"In previous years we didn't see this rate of migration," Musallem said. "Now, exit is not on individual basis. Whole families are leaving, selling their cars, homes and all their properties."

The signs of despair are evident at Ayyad's home. Posters declaring him a martyr of Jesus hang on the walls. There is no Christmas tree this year.
Ayyad's older brother, 35-year old Ibrahim, said his 6-year old son, Khedr, was nagged in school about his uncle's murder. Muslim schoolmates call him infidel.
Ayyad's wife, Pauline, 29, left for Bethlehem a month ago with her two children. She said their 3-year-old son, George, has been shattered by his father's death.
"I tell him Papa Noel (Santa Claus) is coming to see you, and he tells me he wants Papa Rami," she said tearfully during a telephone interview.
Pauline, who is seven months pregnant, said she plans to come back to Gaza for the birth.

But many Christians privately said they would use their travel permits to leave Gaza for good, even if that means remaining in the West Bank as illegal residents. Israeli security officials said they were permitting 400 Gaza Christians to travel through Israel to Bethlehem for Christmas.

A family of four, refusing to be identified for fear their permits would be revoked, have sold their house and car and packed their bags. The wife has transferred her job to the West Bank and enrolled her son and daughter in school there. "We fear what is to come," said the husband.

A distant relative of Ayyad, Fouad, said he also is packing up. He said his father, a guard at a local church, was stopped recently by unknown bearded men who put a gun to his head before he was rescued by passers-by.

"We don't know why it happened," the 20-year-old police officer said. "We can't be sure how they (Muslims) think anymore."

Those who are staying are trying to limit the risks. Nazek Surri, a Roman Catholic, walked out from Sunday's service with a Muslim-style scarf covering her head.

"We have to respect the atmosphere we are living in. We have to go with the trend," she said.

maandag 24 december 2007

Hamas ziet niets in wapenstilstand met Zionistische agressors

Heeft Hamas nu wel of geen 'truce' of 'hudna' of andere vorm van 'kalmte' aangeboden? Veel kranten schijnen het belangrijker te vinden te melden dat Israël dit afwijst, maar wat heeft het voor nut over iets te praten wat niet eens is aangeboden?
 
 
Ismail Haniya, the leader of the Hamas government in Gaza, had expressed a willingness, in a telephone call to an Israeli television reporter last week, to enter into talks with Israel for a mutual cease-fire. But Olmert said that Israel had "no interest in negotiating with elements" who do not fulfill the internationally approved conditions of recognizing Israel and renouncing violence.
 
Olmert also appeared to oppose any lull in the fighting based on an informal understanding, describing the hostilities in Gaza as "a true war" between the Israeli military and "terrorist elements." Defense Minister Ehud Barak also ruled out talks with Hamas, but suggested that if Hamas successfully stopped the rocket fire, Israel might reciprocate.
 
Barak was quoted by the Israeli media as telling the cabinet, "If they stop firing, we won't be opposed to quiet." Similarly, the Israeli vice prime minister, Haim Ramon, told Israel Radio: "Usually when there was no terror activity against us we did not act against the terrorists."
 
But a Hamas spokesman, Ismail Radwan, said, "The Palestinian people have a right to continue resistance."
 
 
 
Ratna
----------

Hamas: No sense to talk about any calm in light of the Zionist aggression on the Palestinian people
23 December 2007
 
Website of  Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades  - the armed branch of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).
www.alqassam.ps/english/?action=showdetail&fid=776

Palestinian resistance factions declared that the time is not suitable for a truce with the Israeli occupation in light of the continued aggression. The factions affirmed that its priorities at the present time are to respond to the Israeli crimes and aggressions against the Palestinian people.

One of Hamas leaders, Ismail Redwan, Said to Al A'alam channel " There is no sense to talk about any calm in light of this continuing aggression against the Palestinian people. The Zionist enemy wants to talk about calm through cover for its continued crimes against our people."

Khader Habib, a leader in the Islamic Jihad movement, said "The first requirement of calm is stopping the Zionist aggression," he added that the calm have conditions must be paid by the Israeli enemy on the basis that there is no free calm with the enemy.

The Central Committee member of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestinian, Jamil Mezhir, said "We are in the Popular Front against the truce and calm and we are with the continued resistance against the Israeli occupation".


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Israël breidt Joodse wijken uit in Oost-Jeruzalem (Har Homa en Ma'aleh Adumim)

Het 8 Uur Journaal gisteren pakte groot uit over de aangekondigde bouw van ruim 700 nieuwe woningen in Har Homa en Maaleh Adumim, met een uitgebreide reportage over hoe deze Joodse wijken 'Arabisch Jeruzalem' (alles buiten de Groene Lijn) afgrendelen van de rest van de Westelijke Jordaanoever. De Palestijnen vrezen dat dit een staat met Oost-Jeruzalem als hoofdstad onmogelijk zal maken en ze een ongunstige positie in de onderhandelingen zullen hebben. Nog nooit heeft het journaal bericht over de waslijst aan ireëele Palestijnse eisen, die voor Israël bepaald geen aantrekkelijk uitgangspunt van onderhandelingen zijn, zoals het recht op terugkeer van de vluchtelingen, de claim op de Klaagmuur, de Tempelberg, de Joodse begraafplaats en het Joodse kwartier in de Oude Stad, de eis dat alle gevangenen moeten worden vrijgelaten, enz. Over de voortgaande ophitsing tegen Israël door de Fatah en in Palestijnse media bericht het journaal ook nooit.
Voor Israël is Jeruzalem geen bezet gebied, maar hun hoofdstad. Men is bovendien terecht bang dat als de stad gedeeld zou worden volgens de Groene Lijn, de Joden wederom toegang tot hun heilige plaatsen ontzegd zal worden (zoals het geval was tussen 1948 en 1967 onder Jordaans bestuur, dat ook 56 van de 57 synagoges verwoestte). 
 
Men is bang dat, als de Oude Stad gedeeld zal worden, biddende Joden aan de Klaagmuur vanaf de Tempelberg beschoten of met stenen bekogeld zullen worden. Ook dit is in het verleden gebeurd. Men is bovendien bang dat deling van de stad grote veiligheidsrisico's met zich mee zal brengen. Veel zelfmoordaanslagen zijn in Jeruzalem gepleegd, omdat de Palestijnen daar vanuit de Westoever zonder controles naartoe konden. Dat is één van de redenen dat het steeds moeilijker voor Palestijnen uit de Westoever is om de stad binnen te komen.
 
Hoe kun je de stad delen, vrije toegang tot de Tempelberg garanderen en toch aanslagen voorkomen? Dat is geen gemakkelijke vraag, maar het nieuws houdt het liever simpel: Israël is weer eens de boosdoener en helpt het zojuist gestarte vredesproces (allicht welbewust, de Zionisten willen toch helemaal geen vrede?) om zeep.

Ratna
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Sun., December 23, 2007 Haaretz
Last update - 17:27 23/12/2007

Israel expands plans to construct new homes in E. J'lem, W. Bank
By The Associated Press
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/937388.html


Israel has expanded plans to build new homes in a disputed East Jerusalem neighborhood as well as in a nearby settlement, according to the Housing Ministry's proposed budget for 2008.

Israel angered Palestinians and drew criticism from the United States earlier this month when it announced plans to build 307 new apartments in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Har Homa.

However, the proposed budget includes funding for the construction of 500 apartments in Har Homa as well as 240 apartments in the nearby settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim.

Israel intends to hold on to Ma'aleh Adumim, home to more than 30,000 settlers, in any final peace deal with the Palestinians.

Minister for Jerusalem Affairs Rafi Eitan told Army Radio that Israel never promised to halt construction within the municipal borders of Jerusalem, whose eastern sector Israel annexed in 1967 after capturing it in the Six-Day War.

"Har Homa is an integral, organic part of Jerusalem," Eitan said. "No promise was ever given to anyone that we wouldn't continue to build in Har Homa, because it's within the municipal borders of Jerusalem."

"Ma'aleh Adumim," Eitan added, "is an integral part of Jerusalem in any peace accord."

Ma'aleh Adumim is one of three settlement blocs that Israel expects to retain in any peace accord. The Palestinians have expressed willingness to consider swapping West Bank land retained by Israel for sovereign Israeli territory.

Abbas alleged that the construction projects undermined new peace efforts.

"The negotiations are facing obstacles," Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas told members of his Fatah Party. "We can't understand these settlement activities at a time we're talking about final-status negotiations."

Chief Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qureia said Friday that Israel must halt all settlement building before final status talks launched last month can continue in earnest.

Fatah verjaardagsposter met heel Israël als Palestina

Een van de vele tekenen dat ook Fatah niet uit is op twee staten voor twee volken en een einde aan het geweld. Stoppen met ophitsing tot geweld tegen Israël is een van de vereisten in de eerste fase van de Routekaart.
 
------------------------

In Fatah map all of Israel is Palestine
Khaled Abu Toameh , THE JERUSALEM POST Dec. 22, 2007

Fatah is planning to mark its 43rd anniversary this year with a new poster that presents all of Israel as Palestine.
Designed specifically for the occasion by Abdel Mun'em Ibrahim, the poster features a map of Israel that is entirely draped with a Palestinian keffiyeh scarf.

It also carries a drawing of a rifle as a symbol of the "armed struggle" against Israel.

The poster, which has been endorsed by the Fatah leadership, has already been posted on a number of Fatah-affiliated Web sites.

The underlying message of the poster is that Fatah, like Hamas, does not recognize Israel's existence.

The emblem is in violation of Fatah's declared policy, which envisions an independent Palestinian state alongside, and not instead of, Israel.

By including a rifle in the poster, Fatah is sending a message to the Palestinian public that it has not abandoned the option of "armed resistance," despite current peace talks with Israel.

Founded in 1965, Fatah has celebrated its anniversary over the past 14 years with major rallies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But it's not clear at this stage if Hamas would allow Fatah to hold a big rally in the Gaza Strip.

Last week, Fatah banned Hamas from holding rallies in the West Bank to mark the 20th anniversary of the Islamist movement. Hamas officials have threatened to retaliate by barring Fatah rallies in the Gaza Strip.

zondag 23 december 2007

De betekenis van Jihad in de islam en het moslimterrorisme

Wat betekent Jihad en welke rol speelt het in de islam? De oorspronkelijke betekenis van "Heilige Oorlog" werd door de mystieke Soefistenstroming nadien aangevuld met de betekenis van een innerlijke, spirituele strijd tussen goed en kwaad. Veel gematigde hedendaagse moslims verwijzen ook naar die innerlijke betekenis. De moderne Jihadisten wijzen echter op oude teksten in de Koran en de Hadith die wel degelijk doelen op een gewapende strijd tegen ongelovigen, om het grondgebied van de islamitische Oemma, de "Dar al-islam", te verdedigen dan wel uit te breiden. (In beide gevallen is Israël de pineut, want het Heilige Land wordt als verloren moslimgebied gerekend dat terug veroverd dient te worden.)
 
In onderstaand verhelderend artikel komen ook aan bod de reactie op de vroegere suprematie van de islam in het Midden-Oosten en (verre) omgeving, en islamitisch protest. Politiek correct denken leidt vaak tot de foutieve conclusie dat aan terroristische aanslagen gepleegd door moslims dezelfde motieven ten grondslag liggen als aan seculier terrorisme.
 
 
The phenomenon of jihad, and the idea of self-sacrifice in battle for the sake of Allah (shahada), which is closely linked to it, are not easy to comprehend. In some liberal circles in the West, Islamic terror in Europe is often claimed to be the consequence of economic and social factors, such as the frustration, unemployment, and economic hardships suffered by second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe.
  
This explanation, based on concepts familiar to the secular Westerner, appears to make sense and is therefore readily accepted. Indeed, many liberal-minded researchers and commentators, who see 'the West' as historically guilty vis-à-vis the Third World, are not prepared to accept an explanation linking terrorist activities with jihad and religious extremism, which they construe as disparagement of Islam. Therefore, they prefer explanations that deny or at least blur the connection between suicide terrorist attacks and the Muslim identity of their perpetrators. The problem with such an approach is that, when we look at the profiles of Islamic terrorists in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere, we see that they do not belong to the population evoked by this explanation, namely those suffering from unemployment and economic deprivation. Neither the perpetrators of the Madrid train bombing on March 11, 2004 nor the 19 Al-Qaeda members responsible for the September 11th attacks were uneducated, unemployed young men. Without recognizing that the Islamist belief system is at the root of all these terrorist acts, we cannot possibly understand the nature of these acts or the motives of their perpetrators.
 
 
Het is niet anti-islam om de islamitische motieven te benoemen en te onderzoeken, die de plegers van aanslagen zelf aangeven.
 
Ratna & Wouter
------------------------

Inquiry & Analysis – Jihad & Terrorism
December 20, 2007
No. 411
 
Jihad Today
 
By Menahem Milson*
 
 
The Arabic word jihad has gained wide currency in the media worldwide. Since the 1990s, various countries around the world have seen numerous terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims calling themselves "jihad fighters" – the most deadly of them being the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001.(1) But what exactly is this concept of jihad, which has so much impact on life in the world today? 
   
THE MEANING OF THE WORD JIHAD
 
Let us begin with the meaning of the word jihad as it is understood by the "ordinary" contemporary speaker of Arabic (and also by Muslims who are not Arabs) – I refer to the meaning of the word in "common parlance," to use a British legal term, or in what the Jewish sages called "the language of ordinary people."  In the language of ordinary people, jihad means war against the enemies of Islam. Since this interpretation often arouses controversy or objection among academic experts, I present here a word-for-word translation of what is said about the concept of jihad in a standard 11th grade textbook used in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority:
 
"Jihad is the Islamic term equivalent to the word 'war' among other nations. The difference is that jihad is [war] for the sake of noble and exalted goals, and for the sake of Allah… whereas other nations' wars are wars of evil for the sake of occupying land and seizing natural resources, and for other materialistic goals and base aspirations."(2) 
 
It should be noted that the literal meaning of the word jihad is not "war." Jihad is the nominalized form of the verb jahada, which means "to strive," "to exert oneself." The textbook from which the quote is taken presents this etymological information, but what it stresses – and what is relevant to this investigation – is the accepted meaning of the word in Muslim culture and history, and, of course, its accepted meaning today.(3)
 
THE PLACE OF JIHAD IN THE MUSLIM WORLD VIEW
 
To properly understand the place of jihad in the Muslim world view, it is important to keep in mind that Islam has been, from its very beginning, not only a religion but a political community – the nation of Islam (ummat al-Islam). Muhammad was not merely a prophet communicating the word of God, but a political leader and military commander. Hence, any victory by the army of a Muslim state over non-Muslims is perceived as a victory for Islam itself. According to Islam, Allah promised the Muslims victory and superiority over all other religions worldwide. Allah validated this message with the Battle of Badr, in Ramadan of 624 CE, in which 300 Muslim warriors under Muhammad's command vanquished the 950-strong army of the Quraysh tribe – a military feat which played a crucial role in shaping the Islamic consciousness.(4)
  
This victory was not an isolated event. Rather, it was the harbinger of an impressive series of victories that led to the rise of a Muslim empire stretching from India to the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, the notion of Islamic superiority became engrained in the Muslim religious consciousness. "Islam is superior and cannot be surpassed" – this saying, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, reflects the Muslim sense of superiority, and this self-perception remained unshaken for many centuries, even when the political and military reality no longer supported it.
  
According to the traditional Muslim outlook, humanity is thus divided into two groups: the followers of Islam who are called "believers," and all non-Muslims, who are called "infidels." It is the duty of the Muslims to propagate the one true faith – Islam – throughout the world. Should the infidels refuse to embrace Islam, jihad is the means to vanquish them.
  
Among the infidels, Islam distinguishes between two main groups: idolaters or polytheists (who, in Arabic, are called al-mushrikun – those who place others alongside Allah) and the "People of the Book" (ahl al-kitab), that is, Jews and Christians. Islam recognizes that the Jews and Christians have received divine revelation and divine laws (hence "People of the Book"), but maintains that they distorted the word of God and the holy scriptures, and are thus infidels.
  
The People of the Book are granted special status in Islam, and their fate is different from that of the polytheist infidels. The Muslims are commanded to fight them until they either accept Islam or agree to pay the poll tax (jizya). The basis for dealing with them is laid down in the Koran in the "jizya verse": "Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, of the People of the Book, until they pay the jizya out of hand, in a state of submission..." (Koran 9:29). By paying jizya, the People of the Book indicate that they submit to Muslim rule and accept the status of protected people, called in Arabic ahl al-dhimma.(5)
  
Just as humanity is divided into two – into believers and infidels – the world itself is also divided into the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam), namely the region under Muslim rule, and the abode of war (dar al-harb), referring to all lands not yet under Muslim rule, which must be conquered by the sword, i.e., through jihad.
  
However, jihad, important though it is, is not regarded as a personal obligation (fard 'ain) incumbent upon each and every Muslim. In this, it differs from the "five pillars of Islam" – the declaration of faith (shahada), prayer, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the payment of zakat (alms tax) – which are personal obligations of every individual believer. According to the shari'a, jihad is a collective duty (fard kifaya) of the Muslim nation, or community, as a whole. It is the Muslim ruler who decides when and against whom to declare jihad. When a Muslim ruler declares jihad, it becomes a personal obligation for those whom he orders to take part in the war.
  
There is only one situation in which jihad becomes a personal obligation of each and every Muslim even without an order from the Muslim leadership – namely when non-Muslims attack Muslims or invade a Muslim country. Bin Laden and the adherents of extremist Islam claim that this is the situation today: Islam is under attack, both physically and ideologically. The infidels – Christians and Jews – are invading the lands of Islam: Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, they maintain that waging jihad has become a personal obligation incumbent upon all Muslims, wherever they may be.
  
Even in the modern era, when the balance of power tipped decisively against the Muslims and in favor of the European states, jihad did not recede from the Muslim consciousness. The notion that any confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslims constitutes jihad was so deeply ingrained in Muslim thought that the Muslim rulers of North Africa in the beginning of the 19th century referred even to the actions of Muslim pirates – who used to attack "infidel" ships from ports on the North African coast – as "jihad."
  
Let me enumerate several military conflicts between Muslim and European forces during the 19th century that were defined by the Muslim side as jihad: In 1830, the Algerian leader 'Abd Al-Qadr bin Muhyi Al-Din declared jihad on the French invaders; in the mid 19th century, the Dagestani leader Shamil launched a (partly successful) jihad war against the forces of Czarist Russia; in 1881, the Sudanese Mahdi declared jihad upon the British; in 1912, Sheikh Sayyed Ahmad Al-Sanusi declared jihad against the Italians in Libya; and in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the war alongside Germany and Austria, Sultan Muhammad V declared jihad upon the Entente Powers, though this obviously did not cause all the world's Muslims to join the Ottoman Empire in its war against England, France and Russia. 
    
 
SELF-SACRIFICE FOR THE SAKE OF ALLAH
 
Jihad is obviously closely linked to the concept of self-sacrifice in battle for the sake of Allah (shahada). Shahada means "martyrdom,"(6) and any Muslim who is killed in the course of war with non-Muslims is a shahid (martyr), whether he was engaged in active fighting or not. Every Muslim man, woman, or child whose death came about, directly or indirectly, through the actions of the enemies of Islam is a shahid. Actively pursuing jihad and seeking a martyr's death (istishhad) is especially laudable.
  
Willingness to sacrifice oneself in battle is no small matter, and Koranic verses dealing with war for the sake of Allah (al-jihad fi sabil Allah) reflect the fact that Muhammad's warriors in the early days of Islam were often reluctant to risk their lives, for Allah rebukes them: "You who believe! What (excuse) have you that when it is said to you: 'Go forth [into battle] for the sake of Allah,' you should cling to the earth; are you contented with this world's life instead of the hereafter?... But the goods of this world's life compared with the hereafter is but little" (Koran 9:38). The reward promised to those who sacrifice themselves for Allah is one of the means to overcome the natural fear of death: "Allah hath purchased of the believers their lives and their property; for theirs [in return] is the garden [of Paradise]..." (Koran 9:111). Moreover, the Koran stresses that those who sacrificed their lives for the sake of Allah are not really dead: "Reckon not those who are killed for the sake of Allah as dead; nay, they live [and] are provided sustenance from their Lord" (Koran 3:169).
  
The Koran does not merely promise the martyr a reward in the world to come; a number of Suras in the Koran contain descriptions of the pleasures of Paradise – food, drink and beautiful women. The Muslim traditionists and commentators greatly elaborated on these descriptions, providing, for example, details about the physical and spiritual characteristics of the black-eyed virgins of Paradise.(7) Every man who enters Paradise is rewarded with 72 such brides.
  
The distinction of martyrs, compared to other Muslims, lies primarily in the fact that they are guaranteed the privilege of Paradise: The act of falling in battle for the sake of Allah washes away every violation or sin they have committed during their lives. Moreover, the shahid enters Paradise right away, without enduring the "torments of the grave" ('adhab al-qabr), whereas an ordinary Muslim who does not have the privilege of dying as a martyr must wait for the Day of Judgment, and only then – providing he is sufficiently virtuous – do the gates of Paradise open before him. 
  
The following excerpts show how pervasive is the belief in the pleasures that await the martyr in the world to come:
  
Al-Risala, the Hamas mouthpiece, published the last statement of Sa'id Al-Hutari, the terrorist who carried out the June 1, 2001 suicide bombing near the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv. Al-Hutari says: "I shall turn my body into pieces and bombs that will pursue the sons of Zion, blow them up, and burn the remains [of their bodies]." Addressing his parents, he tells them not to weep over his death, saying, "There is nothing greater than to give one's soul for the sake of Allah on Palestinian soil. Mother, utter cries of joy; Father and brothers, hand out sweets. Your son is awaiting his betrothal to the virgins of Paradise."(8) Indeed, following the death of a shahid, the family does not erect a "mourners' tent," but holds a celebration similar to a wedding celebration: sweets are served and the mother of the "groom" utters cries of joy.
  
Reports in the Palestinian press likewise reflect the acceptance of these beliefs as a familiar and established reality. Journalist Nufuz Al-Bakri, for example, reported the death of the shahid Wael 'Awwad as follows: "The mother of Wael 'Awwad, from Dir Al-Balah, never planned to hold a second wedding for her eldest son, after he married his fiancée Miyada on August 10, 2001 in a simple ceremony attended only by the family. But Wael's real wedding day arrived yesterday, when the angels of [Allah] the Merciful married him, along with the [other] martyrs, to the black-eyed [virgins], while all around rose the cries of joy that his mother had dreamt of on the day of his wedding [to his fiancée]."(9)
  
Hamas official Ashraf Sawaftah told of a ceremony honoring 'Izz Al-Din Al-Masri, who carried out the suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizza parlor in central Jerusalem in August 2001: "His relatives handed out sweets. [They] received their son as a bridegroom who was being married to the black-eyed [virgins], not as one who had been killed and was being laid in the ground."(10)
  
The uncle of Nassim Abu 'Asi, who died in an attempted terrorist attack, said that whenever Nassim was asked why he was not married, he would always reply, "Why would I relinquish the black-eyed [virgins] to marry a woman of clay [i.e. of flesh and blood]?"(11)
  
Hamas leader 'Isma'il Abu Shanab once explained to a foreign reporter: "This is part of the Islamic belief. One who dies a martyr's death is rewarded [in Paradise]. If a shahid who died for the sake of Allah dreams of the black-eyed virgin, he receives her."(12)
  
The children in the Hamas education system are taught, beginning in kindergarten, that martyrs are rewarded with 72 virgins in Paradise. After touring Hamas schools in Gaza, Jack Kelley of the American daily USA Today wrote that, in one of the classes he visited, an 11-year-old was speaking before the class, saying: "I will turn my body into a bomb that will tear the flesh of the Zionists, the sons of apes and pigs… I will tear their bodies into little pieces and cause them more pain than they could have ever imagined." The teacher responded by saying, "May the virgins give you pleasure!" A 16-year-old youth told Kelley that "most boys cannot stop thinking about the virgins of Paradise."(13)
  
The terrorists who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks also believed that the black-eyed virgins were among the rewards awaiting them in Paradise. A letter of instructions found in the vehicle of Nawaf al-Hazmi contained two mentions of the wide-eyed virgins:  "...Do not show signs of discomfort of anxiety, be relaxed and happy. Rest assured that you are carrying out an operation that Allah desires and of which He approves. When the time comes, Allah willing, you will enjoy the virgins of Paradise... Know that Paradise has been bedecked with the finest decorations in anticipation of your coming, and that the black-eyed [virgins] are calling to you..."(14)
  
The chief mufti of the Palestinian Authority police, Sheikh 'Abd Al-Salam Abu Shukheydem, also mentioned the virgins as one of the rewards of the martyr: "From the moment he sheds the first drop of blood, he does not feel the pain of his wounds, and he is forgiven all his sins; he sees his seat in Paradise; he is spared the torment of the grave and the great horror of Judgment Day; he marries the black-eyed [virgins]; he vouches for 70 of his family members; he receives a crown of honor inlaid with a precious stone that is more valuable than this entire world and everything in it."(15) The phrase "he vouches for 70 of his family members" refers to another reward of the martyr, less known than the black-eyed virgins but nevertheless very significant: a shahid is allowed to bring 70 of his relatives into Paradise, by his own choice and recommendation. This exceptional privilege confers prestige on the shahid and special status on his family.
  
The last statement of Hanadi Jaradat, who carried out the October 2003 suicide bombing at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, sheds light on the perception of martyrdom in general, but especially on this aspect of the martyr's reward. This document, posted on the website of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reads as follows:
  
"The Exalted One [i.e., Allah] said [in the Koran]: 'Reckon not those who are killed for the sake of Allah as dead; nay, they live [and] are provided sustenance from their Lord' [Koran 3:169]. Verily, Allah's words are true.
  
"My dear family, whom the Master of the World will reward as He promised us all in His Holy Book... Allah promised Paradise to those who persevere in all that He has brought upon them – and what a good dwelling Paradise is.
  
"Therefore, reckon my sacrifice in anticipation of the reward that Allah, may He be praised and exalted, will [grant] you in the hereafter. [My life] is not too great a sacrifice for the sake of the religion of Allah. I have always believed in what is said in the Holy Koran, and I have been yearning for the rivers of Paradise, and I have been yearning to see the glorious light of Allah's face. I have been yearning for all these ever since Allah bestowed guidance upon me…"(16)
  
The expression "reckon my sacrifice in anticipation of the reward that Allah... will [grant] you in the hereafter" recurs four times in Jaradat's letter – addressing her family, her loved ones, her father, and her mother. This expression – referring to the special privileges conferred upon a shahid's family – is familiar and clear to any Muslim.
   
 
THE CULTURE OF DEATH
 
On February 16, 2003, an Islamist website posted the contents of an audiocassette of a sermon by Osama bin Laden. The sermon naturally created an uproar in the media. Particular attention was paid to the last sentence, which was especially curious and somewhat alarming. In this sentence, bin Laden quoted a few lines from a poem:
 
"O Lord, when death arrives, let it not be upon a bier covered with green shrouds,
"Rather, let my grave be in the belly of an eagle, tranquil in the sky, among hovering eagles."
 
Various commentaries appeared in the media by experts in various fields – such as Middle East specialists, intelligence experts, experts on counter-terrorism, and so on – who proposed different interpretations. Some suggested that these words hinted at an imminent aerial attack, along the lines of 9/11, with the eagle symbolizing the hijacked airplane flown by suicide terrorists. Others maintained that the eagle symbolized not the attack itself but the target of the attack – not the aircraft, but the United States, whose emblem is an eagle. Some termed this sermon "bin Laden's testament" based on an apparent reference to the expressed desire for burial in "the belly of an eagle."
  
These interpretations, however, are way off the mark. When we at MEMRI translated the sermon in full, it became apparent that bin Laden was referring neither to an American eagle nor to a hijacked airplane. The poet quoted by bin Laden yearns to die a hero's death as a shahid (martyr) on the battlefield and to be consumed by an eagle, which would then bear him up to heaven, where he would reach the throne of Allah. The eighth-century Arab who authored the poem was a member of a fanatical militant sect of Islam.(17)
  
I have mentioned bin Laden's sermon in order to highlight two central characteristics of modern jihadist Islam. The first is identification with the early generations of Islam, the first hundred years of its Islamic history. It is impossible to understand contemporary extremist Islam if one does not regard it as a religious movement whose members strive to follow the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in this early period of Islam. They believe that if they act out of faith and readiness for self-sacrifice, like the Islamic warriors of the Prophet's era, they will prevail over armies superior to them in both numbers and equipment. Early Islam – the era of Islam's far-reaching conquests – is the exemplary era of Islam and the source of their inspiration.
  
Another motif that runs through this part of bin Laden's sermon is death for the sake of Allah. This too is a prominent motif in jihadist Islam, which is manifest, for example, in the motto of the Hamas movement: "Allah is our goal, the Messenger our model, the Koran our constitution, jihad our path, and martyrdom for the sake of Allah our aspiration." At an end-of-year ceremony in a Hamas kindergarten in Gaza, the children, dressed in camouflage uniform, enthusiastically chanted this slogan.(18)
  
Islamic zealots speak boastfully of their "love of death," contrasting themselves with their enemies (in particular the Jews), who love life. In this context, they frequently quote the words spoken by the Muslim military commander Khaled bin Al-Walid to a Persian commander on the eve of the battle between the Muslim and the Persian armies: "I am bringing with me warriors who love death, while you love life."(19)
    

REACTION TO THE DECLINE OF MUSLIM POWER

The engrained belief in Muslim superiority was seriously shaken during the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Russians, and when various Muslim-ruled lands fell under non-Muslim rule: Algeria and Tunisia were conquered by the French, Egypt and Sudan by the British, and the majority of the Balkan countries achieved independence from the Ottomans. In World War I, the Ottoman Empire was totally defeated by Christian powers, and subsequently, in 1924, Turkey's reformist secular leader Kemal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate. To Muslim eyes, it appeared that history had deviated from its predestined course.(20)
  
It was the disturbing recognition that Muslim power was inferior to that of Europe, the West, or Christendom (however the "other side" is perceived) that shaped the outlook of modern Muslim intellectuals, both extremist and moderate. The question that faced, and that continues to face, Arab intellectuals and political leaders was how the Arab peoples, which constitute the heart of Islam both historically and ideologically, could regain their rightful place in history.
  
Ideological and political answers to this question are of two kinds. First, there are the answers proposed by the Islamist school of thought. The Islamists argued that the decline in Muslim power did not stem from any flaw in Islam, but rather from the fact that the Muslims had abandoned Islam. Their maxim was: "There is no fault in Islam; the flaw lies with the Muslims." According to them, when Muslims return to the original, pure Islam, all the ills of Muslim society will disappear, and the Muslim nation, led by the Arabs under the banner of Islam, will be in a position to fulfill its historical mission. They call to return to the Islam of the early generations, known in Arabic as al-salaf. This stream is therefore called "Salafi Islam." The Salafi stream is represented in the Arab world by two movements: The first is Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) in the middle of the 18th century, which is the dominant school of Islam in Saudi Arabia; the second is the Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928 in Alexandria, Egypt, which today has branches in other Arab countries as well.
  
Answers of a different kind were proposed by the nationalist school of thought.(21) The concept of nationalism took root in the Arab world in general, and in Egypt in particular, in two different forms: local nationalism, defined by country, and pan-Arab nationalism, based on the unity of language and culture throughout the Arab world. In the contest between local, single-state nationalism and pan-Arab nationalism, the latter had a much stronger appeal, due to the close connection between Arab identity and Islam. The proponents of pan-Arabism believed that the unification of all Arabs would enable the Arab countries to regain their rightful place in history. The influence of pan-Arabism grew after World War II and peaked in the 1950s and 1960s. Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasser's Arab Socialism and the Ba'th movement were both based on the concept of pan-Arab nationalism as the foundation of the Arabs' collective identity. The ideological and political differences between the nationalists on the one hand and the Salafists on the other (both the Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood) were vast.
  
Salafism – both that of the Wahhabis and that of the Muslim Brotherhood – derives its inspiration from the works of 14th-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who called to purge Islam of all impurities, stressing the centrality of jihad as a personal obligation of each and every Muslim in times when Islam is under threat. According to Ibn Taymiyya, a Muslim ruler who commits grave sins or applies alien laws (i.e., non-Islamic laws) is no better than an apostate (murtadd) and should be put to death. Hence, war against such rulers is a religious duty, namely jihad.(22)
  
The 1967 Six-Day War, bringing with it the collapse of the Nasserite vision, was a cataclysmic event for the Arabs: an utter defeat, which naturally had religious significance. As far as the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists were concerned, the collapse of the Arab armies, although distressing, was understandable and even justified. In their eyes, it was the Arabs' punishment for having abandoned Islam, and it offered an opportunity for repentance and rectification. For the Muslim Brotherhood and the other Islamists, the 1967 military debacle – even more than the defeat of 1948 – proved the worthlessness of secular Arab nationalism, Nasserist and Ba'athist alike. The slogan "Islam is the solution" was now being proclaimed with greater force. But the way towards implementing this slogan in practice had not yet been found. The Islamists had great difficulty in living up to their own ideals when it came to jihad against the infidels inside and outside the Muslim world. It took unique historical circumstances to bring about the return of jihad.
 
 
THE RETURN OF JIHAD
 
The takeover of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Tehran and the taking of American hostages by Iranian students on November 4, 1979 was greeted throughout the Muslim world as a victory of Islam over the infidels. Iranian students had managed to humiliate the great American superpower – and had thereby confirmed the Islamist belief that, by acting fearlessly in the name of Islam, Muslims could defeat the infidels. The fact that this was a victory by Shi'ites, a minority group in the Islamic world, did not detract from the sense of achievement among Muslims in general. In the grand division of the world into two camps – believers and infidels – there was a near-universal Muslim solidarity with Khomeini's Iran.
  
For the Saudi regime, however, the prestige earned by the Islamic Revolution in Iran posed a problem. After all, it is the House of Saud, the Defender of the Two Holy Places (i.e., Mecca and Medina), that should rightfully be the guardian of the true Islam – that is, Sunni Islam in accordance with the Wahhabi doctrine. In their view, it was they who deserved to lead the Islamic awakening – not the heretical Shi'ite Ayatollah Khomeini, whom they considered not much better than an infidel. The religious aura of the House of Saud was a political asset in the pan-Arab and international arena, and even more so within its own kingdom. In order to preserve its religious status, it had to win the struggle for primacy as the champions of Islam throughout the world. Therefore, in response to the challenge posed by the Iranian Revolution, the Saudis took a dual course of action: They embarked upon jihad against the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and they launched a far-reaching operation for the propagation of Islam.
  
To achieve the latter goal, they invested billions of dollars through Islamic charities in order to build mosques and religious seminaries (madrasas) throughout the world. Obviously, these madrasas and mosques were venues for Wahhabism, disseminating the doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya. The propagation of Wahhabi Islam worldwide served an internal purpose as well, countering charges of moral laxity directed against the Saudi regime. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, beginning in 1979, there has been a process of "Wahhabization" throughout the world. Although this process cannot be quantified, its effects are evident in far-flung Muslim communities, from Manchester to San Diego, from Shanghai to Oslo.
  
The 1989 Soviet debacle in Afghanistan was a great victory for Islamism. A decade after Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Iran, Sunni Islam triumphed over the infidel Communist power. The U.S. believed at the time that they had effectively manipulated Islam to deal a blow to the Soviets, but for the Islamists this was only a single battle in the global drama that would unfold until the ultimate victory of Islam, which would include the defeat of the U.S.
  
A series of terrorist operations during the 1990s signaled the direction and goals of the Islamists: jihad against the "infidel power" – the U.S.(23)
  
On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden and four of his aides, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued their "Declaration of Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jews," which was a declaration of all-out holy war against the U.S. and its allies. The unique significance of this declaration lay in the fact that bin Laden and his associates had pronounced this jihad to be the personal obligation of each and every Muslim throughout the world. They based their decision on the teachings of medieval Muslim authorities, primarily Ibn Taymiyya, maintaining that the circumstances, which the declaration describes, warranted this unusual decision. The declaration stated: ""Killing the Americans and their allies – both civilians and military personnel – is a religious duty for every individual Muslim who can do this, in any country in which he can do this."
  
Islamist jihad has two goals, both global. One of these is to wage war against the main infidel power, the U.S., and all of its allies. Israel and the Jews are singled out in bin Laden's jihad declaration as allies of America. It presents the 1991 Gulf War as an operation by "the Crusader-Zionist alliance." It further states that one of the goals of the U.S. in its campaigns in the Middle East is "to help the tiny Jewish state and to distract attention from the fact that it is occupying Jerusalem and murdering Muslims."
  
The other goal is to topple the evil regimes in the Muslim countries, because their leaders are only outwardly Muslim. It is thus a religious obligation to fight them, depose them, and establish a truly Islamic regime in their place. The ultimate goal of jihad is to impose Islam on the entire world as the only true religion. This fundamental stance of Islam is manifested in bin Laden's call on the American people to embrace Islam, thereby putting an end to the war in Iraq.(24) Bin Laden reminds the Americans that "the biggest and most irreversible error one can commit in this world is to die without surrendering oneself to Allah, namely, to die without embracing Islam."
  
Osama bin Laden's declaration of jihad is not an isolated document. Similar calls – and even stronger ones – are made regularly in Friday sermons that are broadcast live on Arab television across the Arab and Muslim world, and even in the West. These sermons include exhortations to slaughter Jews and Americans because "Allah has commanded the killing of the infidels."(25) From the Islamist perspective, Muslims are in a no-holds-barred war of jihad.
  
The phenomenon of jihad, and the idea of self-sacrifice in battle for the sake of Allah (shahada), which is closely linked to it, are not easy to comprehend. In some liberal circles in the West, Islamic terror in Europe is often claimed to be the consequence of economic and social factors, such as the frustration, unemployment, and economic hardships suffered by second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe.
  
This explanation, based on concepts familiar to the secular Westerner, appears to make sense and is therefore readily accepted. Indeed, many liberal-minded researchers and commentators, who see 'the West' as historically guilty vis-à-vis the Third World, are not prepared to accept an explanation linking terrorist activities with jihad and religious extremism, which they construe as disparagement of Islam. Therefore, they prefer explanations that deny or at least blur the connection between suicide terrorist attacks and the Muslim identity of their perpetrators. The problem with such an approach is that, when we look at the profiles of Islamic terrorists in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere, we see that they do not belong to the population evoked by this explanation, namely those suffering from unemployment and economic deprivation. Neither the perpetrators of the Madrid train bombing on March 11, 2004 nor the 19 Al-Qaeda members responsible for the September 11th attacks were uneducated, unemployed young men. Without recognizing that the Islamist belief system is at the root of all these terrorist acts, we cannot possibly understand the nature of these acts or the motives of their perpetrators.
    
 
MUSLIM PROTEST AGAINST JIHADIST ISLAM
 
In the preceding sections I have described the phenomenon of modern jihad and its early Islamic roots. It is now necessary to present the limits of its power and influence.
  
Islamist terrorism has won sympathy in the Muslim world, but the Islamist call for universal jihad has had only limited success. The extremist Islamic organizations are all clandestine, and the Arab regimes, in the interest of self-preservation, fight them in various ways – including some attempts to delegitimize them from the Islamic religious point of view. The Egyptian and Saudi Arabian media publish abundant information about the struggle of officially ordained clerics against extremist Islamic groups. Bin Laden's call for all-encompassing jihad has thus clearly failed to move the entire Muslim world. In fact, even some of the extremist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt do not subscribe to the idea of global jihad waged here and now, and against all infidels, within and without.(26) On October 1, 2007, Saudi Mufti Sheikh Abd Al-'Aziz bin Abdallah Aal Al-Sheikh issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudi youth from engaging in jihad abroad. The fatwa stated that setting forth to wage jihad without authorization by the ruler is a serious transgression, and that young Saudis who do so are being misled by dubious elements from both the East and the West who are exploiting them in order to accomplish their own aims, and who are actually causing serious damage to Saudi Arabia, to Islam, and to the Muslims.(27) This fatwa is a clear example of the ideological struggle led by the Saudi authorities and a group of Wahhabi religious scholars against the jihadist propaganda.
  
In addition to the authorities' struggle against this propaganda, there is an ongoing ideological struggle by the educated circles against extremism in Islam in general, and against jihad with its culture of death in particular. Muslim thinkers and writers who strive for social and cultural reform in their countries are calling to abandon the jihad ideology and to desist from fostering hatred of other religions and cultures. Some of these reformist writers have a clearly secular worldview, such as Syrian philosopher Sadiq Al-'Azam, or Arab-American psychiatrist and author Wafa Sultan. Most of the active reformist thinkers, however, do not follow an openly secular doctrine but call for adjustments to Islam to fit it to modern life.
  
The Jordanian-born historian Dr. Shaker Al-Nabulsi, who resides in the U.S.; the Saudi director-general of Al-Arabiya TV and former editor-in-chief of Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashed; the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Al-Qimni; Professor of Psychology at Al-Zaytouna University in Tunis Iqbal Al-Gharbi; Tunisian poet and civil rights activist Basit bin Hassan; Ahmad Al-Baghdadi, Professor of Political Science at the University of Kuwait; Syrian journalist Nidhal Na'isa; former dean of Islamic Law at Qatar University Dr. 'Abd Al-Hamid Al-Ansari; and Egyptian playwright 'Ali Salem are only some of the figures prominent in the ideological struggle against the jihadist culture.(28)
  
This ideological struggle – whether it is fought by the official clerics or by writers and other independent circles – is no simple matter, because jihad is a religious duty, and the reverence for the martyrs of jihad (the shuhada of Islam's first generation – al-salaf al-salih) is shared by all Muslims. This makes the ideological struggle against the Islamists, who evoke the authority of "the pious forefathers," all the more difficult. Arab regimes face an inherent ideological contradiction: On the one hand, their security forces battle the jihadist organizations, while on the other, state-funded schools and mosques continue to disseminate the idea of jihad for the sake of Allah. The conflict within Islam over the issue of jihad is essentially a conflict over the path that Muslim societies should follow – either hostile isolation and war vis-à-vis everything non-Muslim, or integration into the modern world. 
   
*Menahem Milson is professor emeritus of Arabic Literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and MEMRI's academic advisor.
 
Endnotes:
(1) Some of the other attacks were the February 26, 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center; the March 1995 assassination of the American diplomats in Pakistan; the bombing at the Saudi military base in Riyadh in November 1995; the  June 1996 bombing at the American barracks in the Saudi town of Dhahran; the double bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar Al-Salam in August 1998; the attack on the U.S.S. Cole near Aden in October 2000; the March 2004 Madrid bombings; the July 2005 bombings in London; and the deadly bombings in Bali tourist resorts in 2002 and 2005.   
(2) Al-Thaqafa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Education), Ministry of Education, Palestinian Authority, Ramallah, 2003, p. 208.
(3) Jihad can refer not only to actual war, but also to the struggle between good and evil within an individual's soul. This metaphorical understanding of jihad was developed by the Sufis, the Muslim mystics, in the ninth century CE, based on a hadith (oral tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad. On the basis of this hadith, spiritual jihad was termed "the Greater Jihad" (al-jihad al-akbar), while jihad on the battlefront was termed "the Lesser Jihad" (al-jihad al-asghar). However, this understanding of jihad did not supersede the original, historical understanding of the term to mean war against the infidels as a duty incumbent upon every Muslim. 
(4) In Muslim tradition, Ramadan is not only a month of fasting but a month of victory. In the October 1973 war, the codename of the Egyptian-Syrian offensive, which began on the tenth day of Ramadan in the Muslim year of 1393, was "Operation Badr," after the victorious battle of Badr. The war itself is called the Ramadan War (harb ramadhan) in Arabic.    
(5) It should be noted that there is a significant discrepancy between Muslim law and what most Muslim leaders did in practice. The far-ranging Muslim conquests brought large populations of different religions – not only Jews and Christians – under Muslim rule, and all were granted the status of dhimmi. The Muslim scholars found pretexts to allow this, thus granting religious justification for what was essentially a practical necessity.
(6) For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the word shahada has three meanings: a) "testimony" or "bearing witness"; b) the Islamic pronouncement of faith; c) self-sacrifice in battle for the sake of Allah, that is, martyrdom, also known as "the greater shahada."
(7) In the Koran, they are called hur 'ayn. Islamic scholars and commentators have discussed this expression at length, and it is generally agreed that the virgins have wide, black eyes.
(8) Al-Risala (PA), July 7, 2001.
(9) Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), October 4, 2001.
(10) Al-Risala (PA), August 16, 2001.
(11) Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), September 11, 2001.
(12) Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), September 17, 2001.
(13) USA Today, June 26, 2001.
(14) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 30, 2007.
(15) Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), September 17, 1999.
(16) http://www.qudsway.com/Links/Jehad/7/Html_Jehad7/hinadi/hinadi2/hinadi_qudsnet_003.htm.
(17) See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 476, March 5, 2003, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP47603, "Bin Laden's Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice." The poet quoted is Al-Tirimmah ibn Al-Hakim Al-Ta'i (660–743 CE).
(18) See MEMRI TV Clip No. 1468, "Graduation Ceremony at the Islamic Association in Gaza on Hamas TV," May 31, 2007, http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1468.htm.
(19) This historical incident appears in numerous medieval Muslim sources. The version given here is taken from the chronicle by Jarir Al-Tabari (d. 923), from the chapter describing the events of the 12th year following the hijra.
(20) The decline of the Ottoman Empire was a protracted process, which began long before it reached the awareness of the Ottoman elites. Admittedly, as early as the beginning of the 18th century, as a result of the 1699 Karlovitz agreement, the Ottomans could not avoid the realization that the balance of power between the Muslims and the Christian world had shifted against them and that a reform in the system was therefore necessary. However, the sense of crisis did not become widespread among the Muslim elites until the turn of the 19th century.
(21) It is significant that the concept of nationalism as a foundation for collective identity came to Islam from the Western culture.
(22) Though all Salafis regard ibn Taymiyya as a religious authority and source of inspiration, not all of them interpret the duty of jihad in the same way. The largest differences concern their perception of intra-Muslim jihad, i.e. jihad against Muslim leaders. 
(23) See Endnote 1.
(24) See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1709, "Osama Bin Laden's Video Message to the American People," September 11, 2007, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP170907.
(25) See MEMRI Special Report No. 25, 'Contemporary Islamist Ideology Authorizing Genocidal Murder," January 27, 2004,  http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR2504
(26) Pressure on the part of the Egyptian authorities has caused most of the members of the Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya movement to abandon their claim that it is every Muslim's obligation to fight any government that is outwardly Muslim but that fails to apply Muslim religious law.
(27) The mufti's speech was published in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), in Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), and in Al-Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) on October 2, 2007.
(28) Ample material on reformist opponents to jihad can be found on MEMRI websites www.memri.org and www.memritv.org.

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